

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

~~SECRET~~

C O P Y

TAB to
IAC-D-6/12.1
15 July 1955

11 July 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR THE IAC

SUBJECT: Direct Provision of Intelligence Information by the
National Security Agency to the National Indications
Center

1. The Watch Committee refers to the IAC for decision the matter of NSA direct provision of intelligence information to the staff of the IAC Watch Committee, the NIC.

2. At its meeting on 20 May 1955, the USCIB authorized the Director, NSA, to furnish the NIC, directly or otherwise, such products as are required by the IAC to be so provided. By a memorandum of 17 June (IAC-D-6/12) the Secretary of the IAC noted that the IAC was in a position to determine if the Watch Committee is to authorize the NIC to receive directly selected NSA material of an urgent nature, and requested the Chairman of the Watch Committee to determine the position of the Watch Committee in this matter.

3. The Watch Committee discussed this question at its meetings on 22 and 29 June but was unable to reach unanimous agreement. Certain members favored a controlled direct transmission from NSA to the NIC; the Navy opposed this, and favored the continued transmission of NSA material to the NIC only through IAC agencies. With the exception of the Navy whose position is set forth in the footnote below, members of the Watch Committee accepted the following terms of reference to govern direct transmission from NSA to the NIC, if such is authorized by the IAC:

a. That the NIC be authorized to receive directly from NSA critical items of information or intelligence containing indications of intentions to initiate hostilities and appearing to be so urgent as to warrant earliest consideration by the Watch Committee, and that the Watch Committee be authorized to furnish detailed guidance to NSA and to review at intervals the volume of information transmitted under these terms of reference.

25X1

TAB to
IAC-D-6/12.1
15 July 1955

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

TAB to
IAC-D-6/12.1
15 July 1955

b. That direct dissemination of such items from the NSA to the NIC should be as nearly as possible simultaneous with, but should not take precedence over, NSA dissemination to its regular consumer agencies.

c. That the purpose of this authorization is to enable the NIC, as soon as possible after such critical and urgent items become available to NSA, to accomplish a preliminary evaluation and collation with other available indications in time for the earliest possible consideration by the Watch Committee; but that, as the staff supporting the Watch Committee, the NIC itself is not directly responsible for alerting the highest authorities of the government to the receipt of such critical and urgent items.

d. That regular dissemination of NSA products direct to the NIC is neither required nor authorized, since (1) the normal operation of the NIC as the staff supporting the Watch Committee is based, according to the terms of reference, primarily upon information and intelligence screened and forwarded by the IAC agencies, together with their evaluations where appropriate, (2) the NIC is staffed to operate on that basis and not as a self-contained intelligence agency, and (3) the NIC was not established to duplicate the functions of the several IAC agencies which normally receive direct dissemination of NSA products.

25X1



Vice Chairman, W/C of the IAC

FOOTNOTE: The Navy position on this question is that the present system of supporting the NIC with evaluated special intelligence from the cognizant IAC agencies is satisfactory and no change is necessary. The Navy therefore proposed that the Watch Committee request the IAC to notify the Director of NSA to continue to support the NIC via the IAC agencies as he has in the past.

TAB to
IAC-D-6/12.1
15 July 1955

~~SECRET~~